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‘I’ve Just Been Pretending I Can See This Stuff!’:
Group member voice in decision-making with a
hidden profile
Dawn H. Nicholson , Tim Hopthrow ,
Georgina Randsley deMoura and Giovanni A. Travaglino
Centre for the Study of Group Processes, School of Psychology, University of Kent,
Canterbury, UK
This research seeks to expand our knowledge of what underlies group performance in
Hidden Profile decision tasks, adopting a mixed methods approach. We created a new
mental simulation intervention designed to improve group decision outcomes and
information exchange and tested it across two studies. We supplemented our
quantitative statistical analysis with Thematic Analysis, to explore and better understand
themotivations and utterances of individual groupmembers, whichwe contend are key to
increasing understanding of the challenges operating at individual and group levels in
Hidden Profile decision tasks. Much group decision-making research uses quantitative
methodologies, searching for causal explanations ofwhy things happen as they do in group
processes. As a subset of this area, existent Hidden Profile research is centred in the
quantitative domain. Yet qualitative research can improve the understanding of group
phenomena, such as communication style, which is important in groups’ decision-making.
To our knowledge, noHidden Profile research has taken a similar approach, so this paper
makes a unique contribution. Results indicated the mental simulation had a positive effect
on information exchange and decision quality in a Hidden Profile hiring task.
At an organizational level, groups are ubiquitous and deployed in numerous tasks
(Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010), including decision-making. Yet evidence suggests
groups can struggle in these tasks. Reasons for this vary, including problems such as social
loafing (Latane,Williams, &Harkins, 1979), group polarization (Bettenhausen, 1991), and
groupthink (Janis, 1982). Poor decision-making in groups has been shown to negatively
impact a wide range of outcomes, for example medical decision groups (Hopthrow,
Feder, &Michie, 2011) and hiring decisions, most of which are made by a panel following
a lengthy interview process. Harvard Business Review estimated as much as 80% of
employee turnover is due to bad hiring decisions; for example, Zappos CEO Tony Hsieh
estimated bad hires cost his company ‘well over $100 million’ (Wei, 2010).
Research from the consulting firm, McKinsey (2009), found 60% of senior executives
believed bad strategic decisions were as frequent as good ones. Notwithstanding, group
decision-making remains the norm rather than the exception, principally because in
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organizational contexts, group decision-making has advantages beyond decision quality,
for example legitimacy and acceptance (K€ammer, Gaissmaier, & Czienskowski, 2013);
level of commitment to the decision (Bowman &Wittenbaum, 2012; Levine &Moreland,
1990); and higher acceptance and better implementation of the decision, (Brodbeck,
Kerschreiter,Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007). Getting to the heart of understanding good
group decision-making is therefore imperative.
Information asymmetry and the hidden profile
Brodbeck et al. (2007) argued that failures in organizational group decision-making could
be counteracted in certain circumstances, such that groups could outperform individual
decision-makers. These circumstances require the interaction of: (1) specific types of
information asymmetry being present in the group; and (2) specific types of asymmetries
in information processing being absent from the group.
At its simplest, information asymmetry can be defined as a condition where ‘different
people know different things’ (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 470), a very common situation in group
decision-making. In social psychology, asymmetric information has been conceptualized
in group decision-making research using Hidden Profile decision tasks (Stasser & Titus,
1985). Such tasks are characterized by the fact that they always have an ‘optimal’ answer.
However, the optimal answer is opaque by the fact that information is distributed
asymmetrically between group members: some being shared with all members, whilst
other information is partially shared or unique, perhaps known to only one group
member. Only if groups pool information well enough to highlight the critical unique
information possessed by each member (whether positive or negative), can they hope to
arrive at the optimal solution. This task is further complicated by the fact that individual
information sets held by each group member typically point to a different decisional
outcome than the group’s full information set (Brodbeck et al., 2007), with individual
group members being oriented towards an initial, suboptimal solution.
Such suboptimal decisions can be attributed in part to the fact that decision-making
groups favour shared rather than unique information – the collective information
sampling bias: (CIS: Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989). The existence of the CIS has been
demonstrated in much Hidden Profile research: shared information is discussed more
readily than unique information, leading decision-making groups to suboptimal decision
outcomes (e.g., Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Larson, Foster-Fishman, &
Keys, 1994; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). Unsurprisingly, solving a
Hidden Profile decision task with asymmetric information is more difficult when group
members focus predominantly on shared information. For example, Van Swol, Savadori,
and Sniezek (2003) found the probability of switching from an inferior to a superior
decision in a Hidden Profile task was higher when shared information was not repeated.
Information exchange and use in hidden profiles
Lu, Yuan, and McLeod (2012) meta-analysed 65 Hidden Profile studies conducted over
25 years, concluding that information coverage, the extent to which group members
pooled unique information, was significantly and positively correlated with decision
quality, r = .56, p < .01 – a large effect size. Discussion focus, the extent to which group
members concentrated their discussion on unique information, was also correlated with
decision quality, with a medium effect size, (r = .25, p < .01). This is consistent with
previous meta-analytic findings fromMesmer-Magnus and DeChurch (2009): Information
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Sharing was a positive predictor of team performance, with heavy emphasis on the
uniqueness of the information shared.
Research has also shown information use is important in solving Hidden Profiles (Xiao,
Zhang, & Basadur, 2013). Both use and sharing may be down to the critical role of the
motivation, actions, and processing of the individual groupmembers. For example, in the
context of regulatory focus theory, Burtscher and Meyer (2014) found that groups with a
promotion focus (i.e., able to gain/not gain money by solving tasks) outperformed groups
with a prevention focus (i.e., able only to lose/not lose money for failing to solve a task).
The authors attributed this outcome to groups with a promotion focus being more likely
to favour a risky strategy, including exploring and searching out alternative options.
Conversely, groups with a prevention focus were more likely to be more risk-averse,
therefore less likely to be explorative and more likely to focus on their immediate
environment. Th€urmer, Wieber, and Gollwitzer (2015) added to this through an
examination of a self-regulation perspective. Groups who added ‘if-then’ plans to review
all of the advantages of the non-preferred alternatives prior to making their final decision
outperformed groups who simply committed to review all of the advantages of the non-
preferred alternatives. Consequently, examining individual group member motivation
further may provide additional valuable insights into how groups can improve decision-
making outcomes.
The human factor in group decision-making
Much quantitative research has examined the manifold reasons behind groups’ failures to
solve Hidden Profiles and identified biases and heuristics operating within the group,
influencing both information selection and sharing (see Brodbeck et al., 2007). For
example, groupsmay not discuss X and Y (i.e., discussion bias) or properly evaluate X and
G (i.e., evaluation bias). They may also focus on the negotiation per se rather than sharing
important information (i.e., negotiation focus). These are processes largely driven by the
actions andmotivations of individual groupmembers. Further significant challenges exist
at the individual group member level. These include evaluation bias, leading group
members to favour shared and preference-consistent information (Brodbeck et al., 2007).
Information shared is largely based on individual (suboptimal) preferences and opinions
(Gigone & Hastie, 1997) and shared information supporting those preferences. The
Individual Preference Effect (IPE: Faulm€uller, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt,
2010; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2003), a
form of confirmation bias (see below), whereby individuals are drawn to information
consistent with their own pre-formed preferences, has also been suggested as a further
powerful individual-level explanation for Hidden Profile failures. Faulm€uller et al. (2010)
calculated that almost half of all groups would fail to solve the HP, even when all
informationwas exchanged andno co-ordination losses occurred, as a consequence of the
IPE.
Mojzisch and Schulz-Hardt (2010) gave participants bogus information about
(fictitious) fellow group members preferences. Participants who received no preference
information were more likely to solve Hidden Profiles (61%) than those who were made
aware of other group members’ preferences (28%), even when one of those preferences
favoured the optimal solution. This was replicated in face-to-face groups: Hidden Profile
groups in the ‘no-preference exchange’ condition (instructed to firstly exchange
attributes of the alternatives prior to exchanging their preferences) were more likely
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to solve theHidden Profile than groupswho firstly exchanged their preferences, followed
by attributes of the alternatives (40% vs. 7%).
Prior research has also shown that unhelpful behaviours arise when group members
believe their initial preferences align. For example, research conducted with pseudo
dyads, consisting of a na€ıve participant and a bogus partner, showed group members
evaluated each other more positively when they mentioned information confirming
rather than disconfirming the recipient’s preference (Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, Faulm€uller,
Vogelgesang, & Schulz-Hardt, 2014). Furthermore, higher quality was ascribed to lists
communicated by the partner when they were predominantly preference-consistent.
Recipients of preference-consistent feedback also evaluated themselves and their
partners as more competent than recipients of non-consistent feedback. Compounding
this, Mojzisch et al. found that positive feedback for preference-consistent information
also led to the discussion ofmore preference-consistent information.
Cognitive biases in human reasoning
Cognitive biases – cognitions or mental behaviours that can lead to prejudiced decision-
making – can significantly impair decision quality (Arnott, 2006, p. 59).Confidence biases
are particularly damaging: not only can they increase a person’s belief in their own
decision-making ability but they can also curtail the search for new information pertinent
to the decision. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) identified one key cognitive cause of
overconfidence as confirmation bias: as humans, we seek evidence to confirm our initial
view, rather than disconfirm it. In the case of asymmetric information distribution, where
informationmay be hidden and hard to identify and extract, this individual bias, combined
with the curtailment of the search for new information, may create a perfect decision-
making storm.
As explanations for groups’ failures to solve Hidden Profiles, these challenges
particularly resonate at the level of the individual group member, highlighting the
importance of our contention that insufficient attention has been paid, in previous group
decision-making research, to the individual group member voice. The qualitative
Thematic Analysis element of the present study seeks to redress this problem, examining
and interpreting the voice, motivations, and actions of the individual group members,
beyond the boundaries of an exclusively quantitative approach. To our knowledge, noHP
research has so far taken a similar approach. Thus, combining both exploratory qualitative
analysis with quantitative analysis makes a unique contribution to research on the Hidden
Profile and group decision-making.
Improving group decision-making: Overcoming hidden profile challenges
Achieving superior decision-making is the principal goal of forming decision-making
groups (Brodbeck et al., 2007). This entails training; and interventions to overcome the
challenges of solvingHiddenProfiles should, primarily, be aimed at achievingbetter group
decision outcomes. Broadly, empirically tested interventions break down into three
categories: (1) those that have achieved no improvement of information exchange or
decision quality, (e.g., varying group size and the amount of information shared: Stasser
et al., 1989; increasing group accountability to an external audience: Stewart, Billings, &
Stasser, 1998); (2) those that have improved information exchange (e.g., the introduction
of dissent: Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, & Frey, 2006; the introduction of
decision-making training to increase ‘information-vigilance’: Larson et al., 1994); and (3)
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those that have achieved improvement in both information exchange and decision quality
(e.g., the introduction of minority dissent: Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2002; forced ranking of the alternatives: Hollingshead, 1996; increased
transparency of which group members know what: Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum,
1995).
As noted, dissent has also been shown to play a role in reducing the emphasis of the
group discussion on shared information. Greitemeyer et al. (2006) instructed each
member of a three-person group to act as an advocate for each alternative candidate, to
argue in favour of that candidate and against the other two, versus free-discussion groups
with no such procedure. Advocacy facilitated an increase in unshared information, but
decisionqualitywas unaffected.However, contrived dissent, such as devil’s advocacy, has
been shown to have downsides in decision-making groups. Waddell, Roberto, and Yoon
(2013) found groupswho underwent a devil’s advocacy procedure showed improvement
in decision quality – but participants in those groups reported higher levels of ‘Affective
Conflict’ (Amason, 1996) than free-discussion groups, indicating more personal friction
and personality clashes amongst group members within the group. In a similar vein,
Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001) found that groups with a critical norm, promoting
independence and critical thought, outperformed groups with a consensus norm in a
Hidden Profile decision task.
Mental simulations and counterfactual thinking in group decision-making
Mental simulation, ‘the imitative representation of real or imagined events’ (Rivkin &
Taylor, 1999, p. 1451), provides a potentially powerful solution to improving group
decision-making under conditions of information asymmetry. Crisp, Birtel, and Meleady
(2011) noted, ‘mental simulation is an essential element of the human experience and, as
such, a correspondingly critical component of behavioural change strategies’ (p. 261).
The use ofmental simulation gained prominence in the sports fields (e.g., Feltz & Landers,
1983) and health domains (e.g., Greitemeyer &W€urz, 2005) and has also proven effective
across many psychological domains (e.g., prejudice: Crisp & Turner, 2012; and social
judgments: Hopthrow, Hooper, Mahmood, Meier, & Weger, 2017).
Counterfactual thinking – ‘thoughts ofwhatmight have been, invoked by an event that
nearly occurred’ – has also achieved positive results on decision quality in Hidden Profile
tasks. For example, an individual who misses the train by a few minutes may go into a
thought pattern of ‘what if’ or ‘if only’. Galinsky, Moskowitz, and Skurnik (2000)
contended that the idea of considering more than one possibility was primed by the
perception of counterfactual alternatives (see also Galinsky & Kray, 2004). This suggests
considerations of alternative outcomes may debias likelihood judgments, encouraging a
more thorough evaluation of evidence during judgment (e.g., Hirt & Markman, 1995,
Study 2). A counterfactual mindset (CFM) is induced via a ‘what-if’ scenario, unconnected
to the decision task facing the group and its members. In contrast, Hirt, Kardes, and
Markman (2004) found that alternative generation tasks did not activate a CFM in
individuals high in need for structure. Ditrich, Landkammer, and Sassenberg (2019) also
noted the effect of counterfactual thinking may be more complicated than previously
elucidated, conditioned on, for example, the type of CFM induced, (e.g., additive vs.
subtractive) and its relation to the subsequent task; levels of activation (e.g., group vs.
individual) and the focus induced (e.g., interpersonal vs. intrapersonal). This recent work
(recognizing limitations due to low power – 67%) suggests that CFMs may actually be
detrimental in certain social situations, including group decision-making. This is because
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it may increase both biased communication and decision-making. This finding indicates
the importance of researching and exploring alternative mental simulation interventions.
Mental simulationand the premortem. APremortem (Klein, 2003, pp. 98–101), a form
of mental simulation, has previously been identified as a way to reduce bias in
organizational decision-making (Hunt, Layton,&Prince, 2015) – although it has not, to our
knowledge, been empirically tested. Deployed as an exercise for ‘real-life’ groups to
challenge and refine implementation plans, the Premortem asks groups to look into the
future and imagine the plan they are about to implement has failed, resulting in poor
outcomes. They are then asked to generate reasons for this failure, through which they
undertake an effective critique of their own plan.
Mental simulation versus CFM. Although at first glance they may seem alike, there are
more differences than similarities between the mental simulation tested here versus a
CFM. Firstly, our mental simulation relates directly to the decision task, rather than being
disconnected from it, as in a CFM. Steinmetz, Tausen, and Risen (2018) noted that
‘mentally simulating an experience by imagining it in detail can evoke the same
consequences as actually experiencing it, albeit to a lesser extent’ (p. 407). The mental
simulation tested here also asks participants to imagine that their decision has gone badly
wrong, resulting in poor organizational outcomes. Kappes and Oettingen (2011) noted
that positive fantasies idealizing a positive future result could actually result in lower
achievement when experimentally induced. They attributed this to a decrease in
participants’ motivation and effort, stemming from their being allowed to ‘mentally
experience a desired future in the present, thereby concealing the need to invest effort to
attain it’ (p. 724). In short, imagining success can lead to a reduction in the energy and
motivation needed to ‘go for it’.
Linked to this is the concept of prospective hindsight (Mitchell, Russo, & Pennington,
1989). Unlike a CFM, requiring past reconstructions of events unconnected to the
decision task, our mental simulation makes the future event (decision failure) certain and
asks participants to generate the reasons why. Mitchell et al. asserted that participants
would work harder to explain a sure event more thoroughly than an uncertain one.
Accordingly, we speculate that imagining an undesirable outcome, such as failure of the
decision, may lead decision-makers to work harder to avoid it.
Finally, Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter (2014) suggested that mental simulation
requires a ‘detailed representation’ of the simulated event, which Steinmetz et al. (2018),
in interpreting their own research findings, suggested could ‘[lead] to more elaborate
engagement than [would] occur in the absence of such prompts’ (p. 414).
Given these qualities, we assert that mental simulation can be effective in overcoming
the well-known challenges of eliciting and integrating unshared (vs. shared) information,
and the bias towards preference-consistent information, which past research has shown
to be key predictors of success in improving group decision-making outcomes (e.g.,
Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).
The current study
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) suggested several mechanisms to combat overconfidence:
(1) accelerated feedback: using a known outcome to get immediate feedback on the
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decision; (2) counterargumentation: thinking up reasons why initial beliefs might be
wrong; (3) paths to trouble: identification of all paths to a specific fault or problem,
including listing additional causes of the problem; and (4) paths to the future: explicit
scenario analysis setting out how the future might play out in one or other specific
direction. The mental simulation tested here incorporates these mechanisms: as noted,
groups and their members are asked to look into the future and receive immediate
feedback that the decision they havemadehas failed (i.e.,accelerated feedback). They are
then asked to generate reasons for this failure (i.e., counterargumentation; paths to
trouble) and consider remedial actions to overcome the problems identified (i.e., paths to
the future).
In the current studies, groups are confronted with the imagined outcome of a failed
decision. Subsequently, they are asked to engage inmental simulation as the collaborative,
problem-solving process through which they can work together to (potentially) change
their decision and the imagined outcome. We believe this should enable group members
to improve analytic and problem-solving processes, leading to better decision outcomes
for the group. Given that we are testing a new intervention, with the outcomes relatively
uncertain, Study 1 begins by testing our data for relationships between the key variables
and theprinciple dependent variable – that is,whether or not groups correctly identify the
Optimal Candidate at T2, following the mental simulation, in a binary logistic regression.
We also examine whether the mental simulation can positively impact information
exchange, evidenced by groups reporting a greater proportion of time discussing the
Optimal versus Suboptimal Candidate at T2. In Study 2,we test themental simulation in an
experimental design, comparing its effect on group decision outcomes against a Control
Group. For Study 1, we hypothesize the following:
H 1a. We anticipate a significant positive relationship between the proportion of time
discussing the Optimal Candidate and whether or not the HP was solved at T2.
H 1b. We anticipate a significant negative relationship between whether or not the HP
was solved at T1 and T2.
H 2. We expect the mental simulation to trigger increased discussion of the Optimal
Candidate.
Thematic analysis
Given the novelty of our intervention, untested inHidden Profile research,we seemerit in
extending our exploration beyond quantitative statistical analysis. Vallaster and Koll
(2002) noted most extant group decision-making theories focus on a static rather than
dynamic analytic perspective, notwithstanding that the factors affecting group decision-
making outcomes are themselves dynamic (e.g., cognitive, affective, and communicative
variables, principally operating at the individual group member level). We concur with
their view that a research approach allowing for a ‘richer understanding of the
phenomena observed’ (p. 42) can add to our understanding of group performance in
Hidden Profile tasks, allowing a deeper exploration of the impact of individual and social
processes in Hidden Profile decision-making groups.
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Eden (2017) highlighted the value of a mixed methods approach, including both
experimental and qualitative studies. He noted that this approach is particularly common
in organizational research, and that qualitativemethods can help to bring ‘arid statistics to
life, [enrich] understanding and [spice-up] research reports’ (p. 103).
Given we are examining a mental simulation intervention new to Hidden Profile
research, qualitative analysis may also be useful to inform our future research approach in
testing and refining the intervention in this context.We therefore combine our quantitative
analysiswithThematicAnalysis of thegroupmemberexchangesduring thedecision task, to
explore the dynamic operating between members of Hidden Profile decision-making
groups – and the potential moderating effect of the mental simulation. Incorporating
Thematic Analysis allows a greater focus on the voice of the individual group members,
movingbeyond simplyquantitatively analysing thewords or information elements that they
contribute to, we hope, offer valuable insights into their actions and motivations.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and data collection
Participants were first-year psychology undergraduate students from a university in
Southeast England (N = 224, 30 males, 193 females, one undeclared; randomly assigned
to groups of fourN = 56) who participated in the experiment as part of the requirements
of a First-Year Psychology Research Class. No payment or course credit was given.
Materials
Face-to-face groups of four undertook a Hidden Profile hiring decision task, adapted from
Baker (2010). Participants were told theywere recruiting for the position of president of a
new campus of their own university (to increase relevance and reality) and asked to select
their preferred candidate for the role from a choice of three – Roberts, Stevens, and Jones.
Participants received a job description, key selection criteria, and highlights from each
candidate’s CV. In addition to the CV highlights, each candidate had 16 items of
information drawn from interviews, references, personal observations, etc. Roberts
(‘Optimal Candidate’): eight positive, four neutral, and four negative characteristics;
Stevens/Jones (‘Suboptimal Candidates’): four positive, eight neutral, and four negative
characteristics, distributed amongst groupmembers asymmetrically (i.e., a Hidden Profile
– Table 1).
Negative information items for the Optimal Candidate were largely shared amongst all
group members, whilst those for the Suboptimal Candidates were shared between two
group members(semi-unique). Conversely, positive items for the Optimal Candidate were
largely unique, known to only one group member, whilst those for the Suboptimal
Candidates were shared by all groupmembers. Thus, individual participants were oriented
towards a Suboptimal Candidate selection, as is typical in Hidden Profile decision tasks.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to groups, told they were participating in a study of
group decision-making processes, then taken to small group laboratories. Participants






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Group member voice in decision-making 9
were deliberately not told that they had different information, nor that any one candidate
was better suited to the role.
Once the study began, participants firstly indicated their individual candidate selection
from the three job applicants (the pre-discussion decision), then, following a group
discussion, made a group candidate selection decision (Time 1 [T1] decision). After this,
groups engaged in amental simulation (MS). In theMS, groupswere asked to imagine that
they had proceeded with the hiring of the group’s chosen candidate and that the next
12 months had gone badly, resulting in poor group and organizational outcomes. Groups
were asked to discuss and generate reasons for these problems, which one group
member, randomly designated by seat, documented in a free form list (this was to ensure
the groupmembers engaged fully with theMS). After the MS, groupswere askedwhether
theywanted tomaintain or change their T1 chosen candidate decision and recorded their
Time 2 (T2) group decision and the other group and individual measures. Geographic
references were changed andminor languagemodifications made from the original Baker
(2010) material, so as to be UK-specific.
All groups were required to complete the study tasks within certain time frames,
otherwise group discussions were free form and leaderless. Group discussions were audio-
recorded, spread across five separate data collection sessions, run consecutively on 1 day.
Measures
Pre-discussion: Individualmeasures. All participantsworked individually to select and
record which candidate they thought should be offered the position.
Information exchange. Information exchangewas operationalized as group time spent
in discussion, as per Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006). Each group was asked to record the
approximate proportion of time spent discussing each candidate (to sum to 100% of the
discussion time) at T1 and T2.
Decision quality – information processing. Each group was asked to select and record
their preferred candidate for the role at T1 and T2. Decision quality was a dichotomous
measure: whether groups selected the Optimal Candidate, solving the HP (coded 1) or
selected a Suboptimal Candidate, failing to solve the HP (coded 0).
Results
Quantitative analysis
Pre-discussion preferences. Initial individual participant hiring selections showed
62.33%of participants favoured a Suboptimal Candidate (i.e., Stevens or Jones), compared
with 37.67% selecting the Optimal Candidate, Roberts. A chi-square goodness of fit test
confirmed the observed frequencies did not differ significantly from expected frequen-
cies, v2 (1, N = 223) = 1.89, p = .170.
Predicting the solution: Was the hidden profile solved at time 2 (T2)?. H1a anticipated
a significant positive relationship between the proportion of time discussing the Optimal
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Candidate and whether or not the HP was solved at T2 and H1b a significant negative
relationship betweenwhether or not the HPwas solved at T1 and T2. The data supported
this.
We conducted multiple binary logistic regression to explore the relationships
between our key variables and the principle dependent variable, that is, whether or not
the Hidden Profile was solved at T2. We simultaneously entered the measurement
variables: (1) T1 Group HP Resolved; (2) the proportion of Time discussing the Optimal
Candidate at T2; and (3) the proportion of Time discussing the Suboptimal Candidates
(averaged over the two Suboptimal Candidates [Stevens and Jones]) at T2 into the
equation.
Results showed the overall model was significant, v2 (2, N = 56) = 15.16, p = .001
(Nagelkerke R2 = .318). Further decompositions showed two variables: (1) the propor-
tion of time discussing the Optimal Candidate at T2; and (2) T1 Group HP resolved, were
significant predictors of T2decision quality. A one-point increase in theproportionof time
recorded discussing the Optimal Candidate after the mental simulation was associated
with a 1.057 times increase in the odds of solving the Hidden Profile at T2. Conversely, a
one-point increase in solving the Hidden Profile at T1 was associated with a .059 times
decrease in the odds of solving the Hidden Profile at T2 (Table 2).
Group information exchange. Mean proportion of group discussion time
H2 predicted the MS would prompt groups to spend a greater amount of time
discussing the Optimal Candidate at T2. The data supported this.We collapsed the data to
analyse choices as eitherOptimal (Roberts) or Suboptimal (Stevens or Jones). A two (Time
1 vs. Time 2) by two (Optimal vs. Suboptimal Candidate) repeated measures ANOVA
yielded a significant main effect of Time: F(1, 54) = 4.75, p = .034, gp2 = .08, and of
Candidate, F(1, 54) = 5.77, p = .020, gp2 = .09, qualified by a significant Time 9 Can-
didate interaction, F(1, 54) = 4.57, p = .037, gp2 = .08.
Post-hoc analysis of this significant interaction showed groups reported spending a
significantly greater proportion of time discussing the Optimal Candidate at T2, after the
MS, versus at T1, t(54) = 2.15, p = .036, Cohen’s d = 0.33 (MT2 = 44.55, SD = 32.63
vs. MT1 = 35.84, SD = 16.92). Conversely, groups reported spending a significantly
reduced proportion of time discussing the Suboptimal Candidate at T2 versus at T1, t
(54) = 2.11, p = .039, Cohen’s d = 0.33 (MT2 = 27.73, SD = 16.32 vs. MT1 = 31.99,
SD = 8.62). In other words, groups reported spending a significantly lower proportion of
time discussing the Suboptimal versus the Optimal Candidate at T2, after the MS, t
(55) = 2.71, p = .009, Cohen’s d = 0.65. There was no significant difference at T1.
Table 2. Summary of binary logistic regression for variables predicting Hidden Profile Solved at T2
Variable B S.E. Wald df p-value Exp(B)
95% CI
Lower Upper
Constant 1.38 .57 5.97 1 .015 .251
T1 Group HP Resolved 2.83 1.11 6.57 1 .010 .059 0.007 0.513
T2 Proportion of time
discussing Optimal Candidate
.056 .017 10.69 1 .001 1.057 1.023 1.093
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Group decision quality. Solving the Hidden Profile at T1 emerged as a significant
negative predictor of solving the Hidden Profile at T2, so we set to explore this finding
further. A chi-square test of association showed no significant difference in the
frequencies with which groups solved the Hidden Profile at T1 versus T2, v2 (1,
N = 56) = .02, p = .877, Φ = .02. We then examined our results for decision quality
differences, isolating our analysis based on whether groups firstly solved the Hidden
Profile at T1 or did not. This revealed a conflicting picture: 25 groups failed to solve the
Hidden Profile at T1. Of these groups, 44% then switched to the Optimal Candidate at T2,
following the mental simulation. A McNemar’s test was significant, p = .001. Conversely,
31 groups solved the Hidden Profile at T1, but 58.10% of these switched to a Suboptimal
Candidate (B or C) following themental simulation. AMcNemar’s testwas also significant,
p < .001.
Exploratory qualitative analysis
We turned to the Thematic Analysis to seek greater insight into the interaction between
the group members and the potential impact of the mental simulation. The audio
recordings of the groupdiscussions (see Procedure above)were transcribed verbatimby a
wholly independent transcription service. A representative sample (approximately 20%)
of the transcripts was checked directly against the audio tapes through play back of the
group discussion and found to be valid and accurate across this sample.
Selecting the data corpus. Sample size guidelines were determined following reference
to Clarke, Braun, and Hayfield (2015). This suggests for focus groups in study with a
unique data source (most closely aligned to the group study examined here) 10 + groups
are a sufficient sample size. Nonetheless, we recognize the challenges involved in
identifying a ‘correct’ sample whose selection is grounded in the availability of research
participants and sufficient resources to analyse the resulting qualitative data set. Previous
critical analyses indicate that this is an acceptable practice in this type of research (Braun
& Clarke, 2019). Groups were randomly selected using an online tool (‘Random-picker’
[Random picker tool: https://www.miniwebtool.com/random-picker/]).
Analytic procedure. Thematic analyses (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of the group discussion
datawas used to identify common themes and salient issues across the dataset of the group
discussions, following these steps:
1. Transcriptswere firstly printed and repeatedly read by the lead researcher, to identify
initial themes and get a clear sense of the whole dataset.
2. Transcripts and audio files were then imported into NVivo software (version 11,
2015) for coding against an initial codebook, developed by the lead researcher
(Table 3). This allowed meaningful organization of the data, with a specific focus on
data items pointing to consistent themes and patterns across the dataset.
3. The lead researcher worked using NVivo to code the transcripts, searching for
potential themes, whilst collating the relevant coded extracts into these same
themes. This procedure allowed identification of the relationship between codes,
themes, and sub-themes. The lead researcher reviewed the themes for overall
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meaningful coherence and to ensure they were well distinguished. Themes were
named in order to clearly identify what they encapsulated.
4. Themes were discussed and agreed with the wider research team, who ensured
objective challenge and oversight was applied.
Thematic analysis results. Overview. Of the 17 groups reviewed, 10 (58.82%) solved
the HP at T1, correctly identifying the Optimal Candidate. Since most group studies
involving a Hidden Profile task achieve a correct result of only 20–30%, we note our result
is an unusually high proportion of correct responses. This suggests a ceiling effect, in all
likelihood due to the fact that the Hidden Profile was not particularly difficult to resolve in
Study 1. Of the remaining seven groupswho chose incorrectly at T1, four switched to the
optimal solution at T2 and the remaining three either maintained their initial incorrect
choice or switched to another incorrect choice at T2.
Analysis showed 14 of the 17 groups began their group discussion by directly asking
each individual group member to state their pre-discussion choice, underscoring the
significance of this initial, individual decision. One group actively chose not to do this
(their initial group selection was a Suboptimal Candidate but switched to Optimal
following the intervention), and the remaining two groups did so less overtly, with one
member rushing to identify their pre-discussion choice.Of these two groups, one selected
andmaintained a Suboptimal Candidate choice and the other initially selected theOptimal
Candidate, then switched to a Suboptimal Candidate following the mental simulation.
Table 3. Nodes and thematic coding framework
Node title Themes












Group Member pretending to
recognize unique information
(ii) ‘Communication Apprehension’ (CA):
Group member(s) pretence levels re: unique information.
Individual Preference Effect (iii) Individual Preference Effect: Impact of pre-discussion choices.
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Thematic analysis. The Thematic Analysis in this subsection is focused around two
key themes identified following review (Table 3). These themes either add to extant
evidence or provide deeper understanding for the reasons behind groups’ failure to solve
Hidden Profile decision tasks. They also complement the quantitative analysis above. The
themes are as follows: (1) pre-discussion preferences (including the Individual Preference
Effect) and dissent amongst individual group members; and (2) ‘Communication
Apprehension’ (CA: McCroskey, 1977): individual group members’ ability/willingness
to acknowledge unique information. By examining these themes prior to and during/after
the MS intervention, we determined to investigate qualitatively the efficacy of the
intervention as a potential tool to improve group performance in Hidden Profile decision
tasks.
The individual preference effect in action. In the following exchanges, group
members exchange a mix of shared, semi-unique and unique information. Excerpt 1
reflects dialogue focused on the group members’ individual preferences (underscoring
the Individual Preference Effect), with the discussion emphasis placed on shared
information. The selection of Jones (a Suboptimal Candidate) is based wholly on shared
information, repeated more and more frequently, as the group reach their decision.
Excerpt one takes place prior to the intervention and displays a pattern that should,
broadly, be expected based on extant Hidden Profile research, that is the semi-unique/
unique information is mentioned by group members (italics), but it is largely ignored,
even when repeated.
Excerpt 1: Group 8(b) (Time 1)
F2:: Basically, because I saw that Roberts hasn’t been working in higher education for four
years, so I don’t know, maybe he could be a bit outdated about his knowledge about how it’s
run. And for Jones, it says tension between the Head and Jones, so maybe he’s not that good
relations-wise.
. . .
F2:: Yeah, and he has a harsh and arrogant leadership style, so I don’t know.
F1:: I didn’t pick Stevens because I thought the bit where it says ‘Tends to discourage new
innovative ideas,’ is a bit of a negative, . . . which one did you go for?
M1:: I put Jones.
. . .
F2:: I chose Stevens. What do you guys think about Stevens?
F3:: I think that he’s assertive, but the fact that he discourages new ideas is kind of bad.
F1:: Yeah, I thought that was quite negative.
F3:: And the fact that he gets drunk at university events isn’t very good as well. Well, that’s
why I didn’t pick him. I don’t know about the rest of you.
F3:: I picked Roberts. Did you pick Roberts?
. . .
F3:: I agree with the point you’re saying with that. I picked Roberts because I think the
positives about her overshadowed the rest. The only thing that I don’t really like was how
there was tension between her and the Head, but I don’t think that’s such a big deal because
it’s probably because they’re in competition.
In excerpt two,we see groupmembersmoving froman incorrect to a correct decision,
following themental simulation.During themental simulation, groupmembers are forced
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into a deeper examination of the failures of Jones, their chosen candidate. It is this closer
interrogation of the earlier group decision that leads to the critical recognition of the fact
that the group members have unique information (italics):
Excerpt 2: Group 8(b) (Time 2)
F1:: So, on here you’ve got ‘A temper that flares suddenly,’ so that could have been an issue.
F3:: Pardon?
F1:: They’ve got a temper that flares suddenly.
. . .
F1:: On mine it says, ‘Following a High Court appearance, Jones’s success rate in
employment law cases fell.’ Have you guys got that on yours?
M1:: Yeah.
F1:: So I don’t knowwhat caused that but it could have been the same issue again. It could be
related to that.
F2::Or it could be theway that she leads people. It says here that she’s arrogant and harsh in
the way that this person leads people.
. . .
F3:: It doesn’t say that he’s harsh.
F1:: I think we’ve all got different ones.
F2:: Yeah, got different ones.
. . .
F3:: I think I’d have picked Roberts after Jones.
F1:: Yeah, I think I’d pick Roberts.
F3:: I was thinking Stevens but the fact that he doesn’t encourage new ideas does stand out.
F1:: Yeah, Roberts has got a collaborative decision-making style, so yeah.
The second excerpt suggests the intervention caused group members to return to the
semi-unique information previously ignored and give it proper focus and attention, fully
integrating it into their decision-making process. Coupledwith the emergence of unique
information regarding Roberts’ decision-making style, this enabled Group 8b to convert
their initially incorrect selection to the correct one. This exemplifies group members’
improving performance in uncovering, recognizing, and integrating critical unique/semi-
unique information following the mental simulation.
Confidence and the individual preference effect. Of the 17 groups scrutinized, only
one group had the same unanimous Suboptimal Candidate (Stevens) as a pre-discussion
choice. The data for this group shows the first group exchange is short, focused
exclusively on shared information. It illustrates the unhelpful influence of overconfi-
dence, which the IPE engenders amongst group members, as the highlighted comments
of M1 in the excerpt below make clear:
Excerpt 3: Group 9(a) (Time 1)
F1::Well I think we should pick Stevens.
F2:: I put Stevens.
M1:: The same.
F3:: So did I.
M1:: Okay, let’s go with it? ((laughter)).
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F1:: But why did we pick Stevens? I picked Stevens because he has experience in a medium-
sized university and this one is. . .
. . .
F1:: Yes, so it’s relatively small so. . . ((?)). So he obviously has experience as. . . he has
experience in the Business Dean of a large Gloucestershire university and Chair of the
Information Technology Department.
M1:: Yes, he was into IT and all that, which helps.
. . .
M1:: ((?)) already – the other [group]s are just not good. So yeah, I thinkwego for it. Thatwas a
hard decision. . . Jeez. . . I think we just get up and leave. . .
. . .
M1:: I’m 100% sure on Stevens but obviously it’s a huge decision.
The mental simulation changes all of this, enabling the group to recognize the
presence of unique information, which emerges quickly once the discussion gets into full
flow during the intervention phase:
Excerpt 4: Group 9(a) (Time 2)
F2:: We all have different things on our sheets.
F3:: Do we?
M1:: Game changer. . .
. . .
F1:: I haven’t got that he’s a drinker.
M1:: That’s why I was going on about him drinking; I wasn’t just saying it like, you know. . .
. . .
M1:: And that he discourages new innovative ideas. . .
. . .
M1:: Yes, why did we hire this guy? What were we thinking?
. . .
F1:: So have we all got different things for the others as well?
M1:: I guess so.
. . .
F2:: Well Roberts might be good because he’s had numerous influential contacts as
Counsellor. . .
F2:: Yeah, I think. . . I’d go for Roberts.
M1:: I’d go for Roberts as well.
F1:: Okay. Why would you go for him?
F2:: . . .Roberts has previous experience as Dean and he’s raised significant amounts of
campaign funds for political parties.He’smadenumerous influential contacts as Councillor
and that’s all in the required qualifications and experience for the job. Um, but. . . he hasn’t
worked in higher education for 4 years though.
F2:: And fund-raising and ((?)).
F1:: But it does say Jones is kind of aggressive and harsh, abrasive, sorry. . .
F1:: So I think Jones has a temper. Roberts would be better.
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F2:: I think Roberts because he hasmadenumerous influential contacts and he’s got. . . Jones
has been on the Board for UKF but he hasn’t really done anything like university ((?)) so he’s
not really experienced.
. . .
Communication Apprehension. Group 8a had a 3:1 initial majority in individual pre-
discussion decisions in favour of Jones. This led to a quick consensus-driven T1 group
selection decision, coupled with much self-congratulation amongst group members who
thought they had successfully worked out that the underlying rationale of the study was
‘How we come to a decision and see how smart we all are!’ (F3).
The mental simulation quickly changes this, offering a valuable insight as to why the
unique/semi-unique information may have been allowed to pass unchallenged. One
explanation suggested by the verbal exchanges is that Communication Apprehension
(CA) amongst the group members played an important role, highlighted by the following
group exchange, triggered by the mental simulation:
Excerpt 5: Group 8(a) (Time 2)
M1:: And say the harsh, arrogant bit.
F3::Where does it say he’s harsh and arrogant?
F1:: ‘Abrasive leadership style.’
F3:: I actually can’t see it.Wait, have you got a different one?Have you all got ...? Loves to cook.
Why have we all got ...? Guys, I think I now see it!
F1:: Yeah!
F3:: I’ve just been pretending I can see this stuff!
F1::Me too!Oneof you guys said something about beinganalcoholic and Iwas like, ‘Yeah!’
The realization of the presence of unique information also triggers embarrassment in
the group members:
Excerpt 6: Group 8(a) (Time 2)
F3::Oh for God’s sake, it’s going to be like, ‘How long did it take them to figure out they’ve all
got different sheets?’ Right, 23 minutes and we’re actually ‘spastics’! Come on, read!
This group fails to correct their initial Suboptimal Candidate selection decision,
although there is a clear suggestion that at least some groupmembers are not comfortable
with this outcome, with F1 noting: ‘now I feel bad that we liked Jones’ and ‘I’m so
annoyed!’
Excerpt 6 provides qualitative support for Communication Apprehension (CA:
McCroskey, 1977) as one reason why group members struggle to bring out unique
information during their discussions in Hidden Profile tasks. Communication Apprehen-
sion has been negatively related to both critical thinking and oral communication (Blume,
Dreher, & Baldwin, 2010). These challenges all need to be overcome if groups are to be
successful in solving Hidden Profile decision tasks.
Even when unique information did emerge, approximately 30% of the groups in this
study failed to acknowledge its presence during their initial group discussion. Themental
simulation provided a framework where realization – and acknowledgement and
integration – of the existence of unique information could occur.
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Study 1 Conclusions
Our analysis indicated an increase in the proportion of time discussing the Optimal
Candidate to be a significant predictor of solving the Hidden Profile at T2. Further analysis
suggested the mental simulation led to greater discussion of the Optimal versus
Suboptimal Candidates at T2. Regarding decision quality, a significant proportion of
groups switched to the Optimal from the Suboptimal Candidate following the interven-
tion. At the same time, however, a significant proportion of groups undergoing themental
simulation also switched their selection decision away from the Optimal to a Suboptimal
Candidate.
Thematic Analysis suggested two clear factors at work: (1) the strong effect of group
members’ commitment to their initial individual selection decision; (2) group members’
reticence in raising unique, disconfirming information. The mental simulation appeared
to attenuate both of these, although we cannot draw clear conclusions given the
limitations of the study design.
Study 2
Study 1 offered indicative positive outcomes for the ability of mental simulation to
improve information exchange and decision quality in face-to-face groups engaged in
Hidden Profile decision tasks. However, Study 1 lacked any formof valid control and saw a
significant proportion of groups solve the Hidden Profile at T1, correctly identifying the
Optimal Candidate (almost 60%), which potentially confounded the results. The work in
Study 1 was largely exploratory; Study 2 extended results from Study 1, offering the first
real test ofmental simulation against a valid control condition and allowing us to formulate
a number of hypotheses.
Study 2 allows us to replicate, and empirically test against a Control, some of the
positive effects noted in Study 1. In addition, we wanted to extend extant research by
examining the effect of mental simulation on confidence biases, which, as Arnott (2006)
noted, have the doubly negative effect of curtailing the search for new information, whilst
increasing individuals’ beliefs in their decision-making capability.
Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H 1. Groups in the mental simulation condition making an initial Suboptimal Candidate
selection will demonstrate improved decision quality, selecting the Optimal Candidate at
T2, more frequently than Control groups.
H 2a. MS Groups will report significantly higher mean group confidence in the Optimal
Candidate between T1 and T2 versus Control groups.
H2b. MSGroupswill report significantly lowermean group confidence in the Suboptimal
Candidates between T1 and T2 versus Control groups.
H 3. Participants in MS groups will be more likely to realize they hold different (unique)
candidate information compared to Control group participants.
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Method
Participants and data collection
Participants were drawn from two separate data collection sessions, set out below:
Session 1: First-year psychology undergraduate students from a university in Southeast
England (N = 180, 28males, 152 females; randomly assigned to groups of fourN = 45)
who participated in the experiment as part of the requirements of a First-Year
Psychology Research Class.
Session 2: Second-year Business/Economics students from a University in Portugal
(N = 120, 48 males, 72 females; randomly assigned to groups of four N = 30) who
participated in the experiment as part of the requirements of their course.
No payment or course credit was given.
These studies were identical, except that material was translated into Portuguese for
the second session. For the purposes of our quantitative analysis, we have therefore
aggregated these two samples for a total ofN = 300 (76males, 224 females; age range 17–
54, M = 19.37, SD = 2.68), randomly assigned to groups of four (N = 75).
A 2 (Intervention Condition (Between): Mental Simulation (MS) vs. Control) 9 2
(Time (Within): T1 vs. T2) mixed factor experimental design was conducted.
Materials
The Hidden Profile material was as Study 1. In a change from Study 1, participants were
asked to rank order their preference for hiring the three candidates for the role –Roberts,
Stevens or Jones – following Hollingshead (1996).
Candidate attribute information was as Study 1, save that we adjusted the distribution
of the attributes for the Optimal Candidate to increase the difficulty level of the Hidden
Profile. Specifically, one positive attribute of the Optimal Candidate was switched from
shared, known to all group members, to unique, known only to one group member, to
ensure that the correct solution was obscured (Table 1).
Procedure
As Study 1 with the following changes.
Task 1 – pre-group discussion individual measures. As before except participants
recorded their individual preferred candidate rank decision (1 = most preferred;
2 = second preference; 3 = least preferred).
Task 2 – groups. Participants discussed and agreed in groups a T1 group candidate rank
decision (1, 2, 3 – as above), then responded to the measures below.
Task 3 – groups. Following the initial group candidate rank exercise, groups undertook
a mental simulation (MS)/Control task. In the MS, groups followed the same procedure as
Study 1, but with reference to the hiring of the group’s first-ranked candidate. Groups in
the MS Condition were also asked to complete an additional step: as well as identifying
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reasons for the failure of their preferred candidate, they were asked to extend the mental
simulation to identify solutions tomitigate or remediate the situation caused by the failure
of their first-ranked candidate (e.g., to provide the candidate with management,
communications or presentation training). Control groups worked together on a word
task.
After the tasks, all groupswere askedwhether theywanted tomaintain or change their
T1 candidate rank decision and recorded their T2 group rank decision and the other
measures.
Measures
Decision quality. The same measures were used as Study 1.
Groupmeasure: Confidence in suboptimal/optimal candidate. Groupswere asked to
(i) record at T1 and T2whether they thought that Roberts (‘Optimal Candidate’), Stevens
or Jones (‘Suboptimal Candidate(s)’) was the best person for the job, responding to the
statement ‘As a group, we are confident Stevens/Roberts/Jones would be the best person
for this job’, on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).
Post-discussion measures. Participants were asked whether they realized they had
different candidate information from their other group members, scored on a 7-point
Likert scale (1 = not at all to 7 = absolutely yes).
Finally, Participants provided demographic data on gender and age.
Results
Pre-discussion preferences
Initial individual participant hiring selections showed 79.00% of participants favoured a
Suboptimal Candidate (i.e., Stevens or Jones), compared with 21.00% selecting the
Optimal Candidate, Roberts. A chi-square goodness of fit test confirmed observed
frequencies differed significantly from expected frequencies, v2 (1, N = 300) = 20.53,
p < .001: the solutionwas obscuredby theHiddenProfile. Thiswas also the casewhenwe
examined the split by experimental condition: Control Condition: v2 (1,
N = 148) = 12.57, p < .001 and Experimental Condition: v2 (1, N = 152) = 8.23,
p = .004.
To test our hypotheses, we excluded those groups who correctly identified and first-
ranked the Optimal Candidate, thereby solving the Hidden Profile. This left 59 groups in
the analysis, 26 and 33 in the Control andMental Simulation Condition, respectively. This
subset of the data was used for all subsequent analysis.
Decision quality. H1 was supported by the data. Ten MS groups (30.30%, N = 33)
selected theOptimal Candidate at T2 compared tonone in theControlCondition. TheChi-
square test revealed that the assumption that the value of the cells expected should be five
or more in at least 80% of the cells was violated – one cell (25%) had an expected count of
less than five. We therefore applied the maximum likelihood ratio test (McHugh, 2013)
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which was significant, v2 (1,N = 59) = 13.21, p < .001,Φ = .40. (Based on the achieved
effect size, post-hoc testing in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007)
suggested this to be indicative of achieved power of approximately 87%).
Decision confidence. Group Confidence in Optimal Candidate:H2awas supported by
the data. MS groups reported significantly higher mean group confidence in the Optimal
Candidate at T2 versus Control groups, t(57) = -2.45, p = .017, with no significant
differences at T1 (Figure 1)
Group Confidence in Suboptimal Candidate (C) H2b was supported by the data. MS
groups reported significantly lowermean group confidence in the Suboptimal Candidates
(aggregated) at T2 versus Control groups, t(50.52) = 3.46, p = .001, with no significant
differences at T1.
Participant awareness of different information. H3 postulated that participants in
groups undergoing a MS would be more likely to realize they held different (unique)
candidate information from Control groups. This was not supported by the data: an
independent t-test was not significant, t(31.68) = 1.33, p = .193.
Discussion
To succeed in decision tasks, particularly those involving asymmetric information, group
members must both uncover and assimilate information. Unfortunately, as Stigler (1961)
noted, ‘the assimilation of information is not an easy or pleasant task for most people’ (p.
222). It is not surprising, therefore, that group decision-making research has focused on
Optimal Suboptimal (Aggregated) Optimal Suboptimal (Aggregated)
Control Mental Simulation
T1 2.46 4.71 3.09 4.62






































Figure 1. Mean group confidence in Optimal/Suboptimal Candidates (aggregated) by intervention and
time (Study 2).
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information processing in groups and how this impacts overall group decision-making,
proving a ‘fruitful ground for research’ (Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 636). The presence of
unique (hidden) information in Hidden Profile decision groups creates an immediate
information asymmetry between those who hold the information and those who do not,
but who could make different – even better – decisions if they had access to that
information (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Accessing, sharing and applying
that information is the key challenge.
The present researchmakes a unique contribution to the literature on group decision-
making in Hidden Profile tasks by undertaking a mixed method analysis, incorporating a
Thematic Analysis. In our first study, binary logistic regression revealed that solving the
Hidden Profile at T1 led to a decrease in the odds of solving the Hidden Profile at T2.
However, increasing the proportion of time discussing the Optimal Candidate during/
after the mental simulation led to an increase in the odds of solving the Hidden Profile at
T2. Coupled with this, results from our analysis confirmed that the mental simulation
triggered an increase in the proportion of time discussing the Optimal Candidate.
TheThematic Analysis fromStudy 1 also provided evidence for: (1) the existence of the
Individual Preference Effect, with individual group members heavily influenced by their
own individual pre-discussion decisions and shown to be sharing information in support
of these; and (2) the existence of Communication Apprehension amongst groupmembers
and its adverse effect, evidenced by their reticence in sharing and recognizing unique
information. Our interpretative analysis of the group members’ narrative exchanges
brought these themes to life, demonstrating clearly how these factors impacted on the
group discussion. The narratives suggested that the mental simulation intervention
attenuated the adverse effects of the Individual Preference Effect and Communication
Apprehension, creating a more cooperative framework, allowing group members to be
honest about their recognition of unique information and also in putting forth a strong
rationale for their chosen candidate. This is an important result, since the mere effect of
receiving information prior to joining the group discussion can lead to preliminary
preference formation, evenwhen not expressly requested. For example, Reimer, Reimer,
and Hinsz (2010) found that na€ıve groups, where group members learned about the
decision task and alternatives for the first time as a group, were more likely to solve the
Hidden Profile than ‘predecided groups’ where individual members entered the
discussion having formed and stated an individual preference. Analysis of the group
discussions found that members of predecided groups focused more on group members’
preferences, whilst na€ıve groups exchanged more unshared information.
Study 2 built on these results in an experimental design, testing the mental simulation
against a control condition. Groups undergoing mental simulation demonstrated: (1)
improved group decision outcomes; (2) increases in group members’ confidence in the
Optimal Candidate; and (3) reductions in group members’ confidence in the Suboptimal
Candidates.
What might underlie themental simulation’s success suggested by these findings? The
Premortem, on which the mental simulation is based, was developed as a tool to enable
teams to critique their own plans prior to implementation (Veinott, Klein, & Wiggins,
2010). In this respect, the mental simulation therefore invokes elements of both critical
thinking and dissent. Both elements, as noted previously, have shown some success in
improving group decision outcomes in Hidden Profile tasks (Greitemeyer et al., 2006;
Postmes et al., 2001).
Postmeset al. (2001) also found thatgroupswith acritical thinkingnormvaluedunshared
and shared informationmore equally. InStudy2, therewasnosignificant differencebetween
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groups in recognizing that they held unique/different information. However, groups in the
mental simulation condition showed a significant increase in confidence in the Optimal
Candidate and a significant reduction in confidence in the Suboptimal Candidate, as well as
better decisionquality. This suggestsmore valuewasascribed tounique information in those
groups. Postmes et al. found that the more groups valued unshared versus shared
information, the better their decisions.Our resultsmirror these findings. A recognitionof the
value of an item of information suggests greater integration of that information. This is also
consistentwith the importanceof integrationhighlighted in thefindingsofXiao et al. (2013).
It is not sufficient to simply identify a piece of unique information.What individuals actually
dowith this piece of information is a critical aspect of the decision-making process, which is
what leads to our focus on group member behaviour.
The exploratory qualitative analysis in the present study bears out that the intent of the
group members is critical and that this can be affected by levels of information asymmetry.
Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, and Boyd (2019) highlighted the important role
information asymmetry plays as a boundary condition in research. Here, the concept of
information asymmetry takes on the role of a moderator within a theoretical model and the
interest level becomes how the focal actors, (i.e., the group members making the group
decision) may change their behaviours depending on changes in the level of information
asymmetry. Bergh et al. (2019) highlighted that the desired state in situations of information
asymmetry is ‘reduce-reduce’ (p. 19), a scenario defined as both parties on both sides of a
transaction collaborating, with the aim of reducing levels of information asymmetry about
each other. Achieving the aim requires the parties involved to actively share information, to
reduce the information mismatch. The alternative scenarios are in sharp contrast: (1)
‘reduce-increase’ – one party seeks to reduce information asymmetry whilst the other
maintains it; and (2) ‘increase-increase’ – both parties seek to increase the level of each
other’s information asymmetry. Bergh et al. noted that how these scenarios play out largely
depends on the goals of the parties and the situation they find themselves in. For example,
‘reduce-increase’ may emerge in scenarios where the same parties have differing goals,
depending on the particular issue: shareholder boards and CEOsmay, on the one hand, both
want to reduce information asymmetry, whilst having conflicting or competing agendas at
other times. The ‘increase-increase’ scenario is more likely to emerge when the parties seek
to retain competitive advantage by maintaining the information mismatch. In Bergh et al.’s
words ‘when the intent is to reduce information asymmetry on both sides of a relationship,
positive resolutions. . .become more likely.’ (p. 19).
The reduce-reduce approach is highly applicable to Hidden Profile group decision-
making scenarios: if all group members are able to collaborate successfully to reduce the
information asymmetries inherent in Hidden Profiles, then optimal decision-making should
emerge. However, this requires cooperation amongst the groupmembers. Toma andButera
(2009) primed groups to either compete or cooperate in a Hidden Profile task. Group
members in groups primed to competeweremore likely towithhold unshared information,
that is, theyweremore likely tomaintain the information asymmetrywithin the group, than
those members of groups primed to cooperate. There was no such difference in how the
group members managed shared information between groups primed to compete or
cooperate. In addition, group members in competitive groups were more reluctant to
disconfirm their initial preferences and decision quality was poorer in these groups. Toma
and Butera’s findings underscored the fact that it is the aims and actions of the individual
groupmembers that hold the key to achieving optimal decision-making in groups and this is
borne out in our qualitative analysis. The mental simulation provided a framework where
group members could work together to achieve reduce-reduce.
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Limitations and future directions
Tomanage the demands of the qualitative thematic analysis, we focused on a small sample
(17 face-to-face groups of four), comprised of first-year undergraduate psychology
students. Consequently, their experience with tasks such as this, particularly involving
hiring decisions, is limited. Additionally, this exercise took place early in the new
university semester, when students were forming new friendships and relationships, so at
a point in timewhen state Communication Apprehension and fear of peer evaluationmay
have been particularly acute. These factors may also have contributed to a lack of
confidence in both group member interactions and shared decision-making.
Alongside this, the strength of the ‘failure frame’ underpinning themental simulation is
also worthy of future examination. As noted, the Premortem, on which the mental
simulation is based, was developed as a tool to enable teams to critique their own plans
prior to implementation (Veinott et al., 2010). Too strong a failure frame could result in
correct decisions being overturned. This could be tested using a Manifest Profile task,
wherewewould expectmost participants to select the correct candidate, then examining
how or if their decisions are impacted by the mental simulation. Experience levels and
confidence amongst decision-makers could also play a part in this.
The qualitative analysis provides some support for the positive impact of the mental
simulation in: (1) enabling group members to uncover and integrate unique (vs. shared)
information and apply it to the group decision; and (2) reducing the bias towards
preference-consistent information. Future studies could evaluate the impact of themental
simulation more directly on these key measures, including repetition, through detailed
coding of the content of the group discussions before and after the intervention, (as per
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006).
In summary, across both studies, the mental simulation demonstrated a positive effect
on group information exchange and decision quality. In Study 2, it also reduced groups’
confidence in the Suboptimal Candidate, whilst increasing confidence in the Optimal
Candidate. Lastly, we believe the additional interpretative license afforded by the
qualitative approach adds valuable insights into group information exchange and
processing in Hidden Profile decision tasks by focusing on the actions and motivations of
the individual group members.
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